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BRIEF OF APPELLEES
NORTH DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY

Defendants-appellees, North Ditch Irrigation Company, Clayton Gardner and Robert
Gappmayer (collectively "North Ditch") respectfully submit this Brief of Appellees.
JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction of this appeal by plaintiffs-appellants Ruby
W. Hicken, Thomas F. Hicken and John T. Hicken (collectively the "Hickens") pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
One issue is presented for review on this appeal:
Did the district court properly dismiss the Hickens' complaint because the
Hickens' claim for a continuous diversion of water from a stream is precluded by the doctrine

219X113070 2

of res judicata under a 1960 judgment and decree that allowed the Hickens' predecessor only
to divert intermittently water from the stream?
The District Court's dismissal is subject to a correction of error standard. See
Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Hansen v.
Department of Fin. Insts.. 858 P.2d 184, 186 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (applying correction of
error standard to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The issue here can be decided without resorting to any statute or regulation.
To the extent such authority may be determinative, the text of Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-1 to 24 (1989 & Supp. 1996) is set forth in the addendum to the Hickens' opening brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This appeal involves the Hickens' claim to a continuous diversion of water
from a stream. The district court rules that the Hickens' claim is barred because it was
already the subject of a judgment and decree ("I960 Judgment") entered by Judge Joseph E.
Nelson 36 years ago. By diverting water from the stream at any time and in any desired
quantity, the Hickens' predecessor disrupted North Ditch's distribution of water from the
stream to its shareholders. The 1960 Judgment restricted the Hickens' predecessor to divert
intermittently one-half of the flow of water from the stream for a period of two hours every
ten days. The Hickens now claim that they are not subject to the 1960 Judgment and may
divert continuously from the stream every day to water livestock.
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B.

Course of Proceedings.

On June 24, 1960, North Ditch Irrigation Company filed a complaint against
Marvie Wall, the Hickens' predecessor in interest. (R. 20, 63.) An order to show cause and
restraining order were entered against Wall. (R. 59.) On July 8, 1960, the court conducted a
hearing on the orders. (R. 57.) On July 14, 1960, Judge Joseph E. Nelson entered findings
of fact and conclusions of law and the 1960 Judgment. (R. 55.) No appeal was taken.
On August 31, 1994, the Hickens filed a verified complaint against North Ditch
in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Wasatch County. (R. 21.) The Hickens simultaneously
filed motions for preliminary injunction (R. 36) and temporary restraining order with notice
(R. 25). No hearing was conducted on these motions. In April 1995, North Ditch moved to
dismiss the Hickens' complaint (R. 44) and for expedited disposition (R. 46).
The court granted North Ditch expedited disposition (R. 78.), and on June 9,
1995, the court conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss. (R. 121.) On June 13, 1995,
the court granted North Ditch's motion to dismiss. (R. 124.) After considering the Hickens'
objections to the proposed orders (R. 128, 145, 157) and North Ditch's responses, (R. 153,
162) the court entered a final order on March 14, 1996 (R. 164, 166), from which the
Hickens now appeal. (R. 170.)
C.

Disposition of the District Court.

On June 13, 1995, the court ruled that the Hickens' claim to divert
continuously for watering livestock was barred under the doctrine of res judicata and granted
North Ditch's motion to dismiss. (R. 124.) The court entered an order dismissing with
prejudice the causes of action set forth in the Hickens' verified complaint. (R. 166.)
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

1960 Judgment.

This case involves a dispute over the diversion of water from a stream called
"Spring Creek" located in Wallsburg, Wasatch County, Utah. Over three decades ago, the
Hickens' predecessor, Marvie Wall (R. 20), claimed he could divert from Spring Creek any
quantity of water, any time he wanted, sufficient for his needs. (R. 56, 59.) Wall's
diversions significantly disrupted North Ditch's distribution of Spring Creek water to its
stockholders. (R. 56.)
Wall's diversions from Spring Creek forced North Ditch to file a lawsuit in
1960 (R. 63), and the Fourth Judicial District Court for Wasatch County issued an order to
show cause and restraining order against Wall (R. 59). The court determined that unless a
restraining order was issued immediately, without notice, Wall would use Spring Creek water
"any time he wants for as long as he wants,'" and as such, the shareholders of North Ditch
"will suffer immediate and irreparable damage to their crops." (R. 59.)
On July 8, 1960, Judge Nelson conducted a hearing on the order to show cause.
(R. 57.) Both North Ditch and Wall were represented by counsel. (R. 57.) Judge Nelson
heard testimony and a stipulation entered into orally before the Court by the parties. (R. 57.)
The parties submitted the matter to Judge Nelson for decision. (R. 57.)
On July 14, 1960, Judge Nelson made the following findings of fact:
1.
[North Ditch] has appropriated two-thirds of the flow of Spring Creek,
said Spring Creek being located in Wallsburg, Wasatch County, State of Utah.
2.
[Wall] and his predecessors in interest have used since before 1900
water out of said Spring Creek in the amounts they thought necessary and at
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the times they desired to irrigate lawn, garden and pasture on the premises
presently occupied by the defendant.
3.
The defendant can beneficially use on said premises one-half of the flow
of said Spring Creek for a period of two hours every 10 days.
4.
At the taking of water by defendant from said Spring Creek in the
amounts he desires and at the time he desires creates a very difficult situation
for [North Ditch] in attempting to regulate the water turns of its stockholders.
(R. 57.)
In addition to these findings of fact, Judge Nelson made the following
conclusions of law:
1.
The defendant, Marvie Wall, is entitled to one-half of the flow of said
Spring Creek for a period of two hours every 10 days.
2.
The defendant, Marvie Wall, should take his water in turns compatible
with water turns of the stockholders of [North Ditch], defendant's first turn to
commence in the afternoon of July 8, 1960.
3.
That with the entering of a decree based on these conclusions of law,
the plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed.
(R. 56.)
On July 14, 1960, Judge Nelson entered the 1960 Judgment based upon these
findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 55.) No appeal followed.
B.

Diligence Claim,

Two days before Judge Nelson's July 8, 1960 hearing, Wall filed with the Utah
state engineer's office a Statement of Water User's Claim to Diligence Rights ("Diligence
Claim").1 (R. 15.) Wall's Diligence Claim purported to describe his right to divert from

1

A diligence claim is a water right established by diverting water from its natural channel
and putting it to beneficial use since before 1903. See, e.g., Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819
P.2d 770, 771 n.l, 773, 773 n.8 (Utah 1991).
219M13070 2
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Spring Creek (i) 1.28 cubic feet per second during the period from April 1 to October 31 each
year for irrigation purposes and (ii) .50 cubic feet per second for stock watering year-round.
(R. 15.)
C.

Water User's Claim.

On September 1, 1944, the Third District Court ordered the state engineer to
determine and adjudicate all rights to the use of water of Utah Lake and the Jordan River in
Utah County. (R. 2.) On June 21, 1972, the court ordered the state engineer to expand the
general adjudication to include tributaries located in Wasatch County. (R. 2.)
On February 25, 1982, plaintiff Ruby Wall Hicken filed with the state engineer
a Statement of Water User's Claim No. 55-1403 ("Water User's Claim").2 (R. 4-5.) In the
Water User's Claim, Ms. Hicken specifically referenced the 1960 Judgment (i.e., "Civil No.
2348") and acknowledged that she was claiming a court "decreed right."3 (R. 5.) Ms.
Hicken claimed only a "2/240 interest" in 3.0 cubic feet per second from Spring Creek for
both irrigation and year-round stock watering. (R. 5.)
The state engineer completed a Proposed Determination4 of numerous water
user's claims asserting rights to use water from sources located in that portion of Wasatch
County which drained into Main Creek, a tributary within the Utah Lake and Jordan River
drainage. (R. 2.) The Proposed Determination covered water claims to use water from
2

To preserve water rights being adjudicated in a general adjudication, water users must
file timely statements of water user's claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-5.
3

A decreed right is a water right established by a judgment entered by a court.

4

See Proposed Determination of Water Rights in Utah Lake & Jordan River Drainage
Area, Provo River Division, Round Valley Subdivision, Code No. 55, Book No. 1 (hereinafter
"Proposed Determination") (R. 1-3.)
219U13070 2
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Spring Creek, including Ms. Hicken's Water User's Claim and the water user's claims of
North Ditch. (R. 1.) On May 1, 1984, the state engineer filed the Proposed Determination
with the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. The state engineer provided
notice that all water claimants dissatisfied with the Proposed Determination must file written
objections thereto within 90 days from the date of service of the Proposed Determination. (R.
2.) The Hickens did not file an objection.
D.

Hickens' 1994 Lawsuit

On August 31, 1994, the Hickens filed a verified complaint against North Ditch
in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Wasatch County claiming a right to divert
continuously .50 cubic feet per second of water from the flow of Spring Creek for watering
livestock. (R. 29, 19-20 fflf 8 and 10; 26-27.) The Hickens are the successors in interest to
Marvie Wall, defendant in the 1960 Judgment. (R. 20.)5
On June 13, 1995, the district court granted North Ditch's motion to dismiss
and ruled that the Hickens' claim was barred under the doctrine of res judicata as applied in
Logan, Hvde Park & Smithfield Canal Co. v. Logan City, 72 Utah 221, 269 P. 776 (1928).
(R. 125.) The court reasoned as follows:
'It is of no consequence whatever that the claims of [the plaintiff] for
[livestock] purposes were not referred to in the pleadings or the judgment.'
Logan [P.] at 778. The fact that the plaintiffs predecessor in interest already
contemplated their alleged rights to the use of water in Spring Creek in 1960
and received a Judgment on the merits is sufficient for this Court to sustain that
Judgment. It is evident from the language of Judge Nelson's Judgment and
Decree that the Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest was 'awarded one-half of the

5

Ruby Wall Hicken alleged that she is the successor in interest to Marvie Wall. (R. 20.)
She alleged that she leased her water rights to her two sons, Thomas F. Hicken and John T.
Hicken. (R. 20.)
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flow of Spring Creek for a period of two hours every ten days.' Such use
could be for any purpose, including watering stock (or storing it for that
purpose). Daily use was not allowed under Judge Nelson's Decree, said use
thereby being precluded.
(R. 123-24.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court properly dismissed the Hickens' verified complaint. The
Hickens' claim to divert continuously from Spring Creek is barred under the doctrine of res
judicata. Hickens' claim involves the same issue previously litigated and resolved by the
1960 Judgment. The Hickens' predecessor, Marvie Wall, could have and should have claimed
a right to divert continuously from Spring Creek for watering livestock. The 1960 Judgment
is a final decision on the merits that is subject to res judicata; it is not a "general adjudication"
of water rights.
The 1960 Judgment unambiguously prohibits the Hickens from diverting
continuously from Spring Creek for watering livestock. The term "turns" used in the 1960
Judgment does not render the decision ambiguous and bars the Hickens' claim to a continuous
diversion for watering livestock. The district court properly rejected the Hickens' assertions
that they have diverted continuously from Spring Creek for watering livestock since before
1960 to the present. By their own admission, the Hickens have not diverted continuously
from Spring Creek for stock watering since the 1960 Judgment. Moreover, the court correctly
determined that the Hickens' livestock will not be threatened if the Hickens are precluded
from diverting continuously for stock watering.
Enforcing the 1960 Judgment to bar the Hickens' claimed right to divert
continuously will preserve vital public interests permitting justified reliance on prior
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judgments, preventing inconsistent decisions, relieving the parties of the cost and vexation of
seemingly endless, multiple lawsuits over the same stream and the same claims, and
preserving judicial resources.
Finally, the Hickens' claim is barred for their failure to protest the Proposed
Determination which awarded the Hickens a right to divert only intermittently from Spring
Creek for a period of two hours every 240 hours (ten days). This determination reflected the
Hickens' Water User's Claim which specifically referenced the 1960 Judgment and
acknowledged the intermittent diversion for both irrigation and stock watering. The Hickens'
failure to object bars their claim.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE 1960 JUDGMENT IS RES JUDICATA AS TO THE HICKENS'
CLAIM FOR A CONTINUOUS DIVERSION AND BARS THEIR CLAIM
Res judicata bars relitigation by the same parties or their privies of an issue that

was litigated before and resolved in a final judgment on the merits. See Madsen v. Borthick,
769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988); Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme. Inc.. 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah
1983); Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno. 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Moreover,
claim preclusion under the doctrine of res judicata "also prevents the litigation of claims that
could and should have been litigated in the prior action, but were not." Recovery Services.
845 P.2d at 946 and cases cited therein (emphasis added).
Without question the 1960 Judgment and the Hickens' 1994 lawsuit against
North Ditch involve the same parties or their privies. Plaintiffs admit they are successors in
interest to Marvie Wall, the defendant in the 1960 lawsuit brought by North Ditch. (R. 20.)
219M13070 2
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A.

The Hickens' Claim is the Same Issue Resolved by the 1960
Judgment

The 1960 litigation and the present lawsuit involve the same issues (i.e., when
and what quantity of water may the Hickens and their predecessor divert from Spring Creek?).
As a result, this case is governed by Logan, Hyde Park & Smithfield Canal Co. v. Logan
City, 72 Utah 221, 268 P. 776 (1928),6 where a prior water rights decree precluded Logan
City from raising a claim to a particular water use different from that decreed. In 1922, the
Logan district court entered a judgment and decree establishing the rights of various parties to
use water from Logan River. Logan City claimed a right to divert water for culinary,
domestic and municipal purposes but failed to assert any right to use such water for
generating power. In a subsequent lawsuit, Logan City asserted a right to use Logan River
water to generate power, a right not alleged in the 1922 pleadings and not mentioned in the
1922 decree.
The Utah Supreme Court determined from the record that the issue decided by
the 1922 decree was the quantity of water that could be used by each claimant and the
particular use to which such water could be placed. See id. at 227, 268 P. at 778. The legal
effect of the 1922 decree was to "forever bar any of the other parties to the decree from
asserting any adverse claim" to the water quantity or water use established by the decree. Id,
268 P. at 778. Therefore, the Court reasoned that Logan City was precluded from asserting a

6

The Hickens imply that Logan should be ignored because its legal strength has
somehow weakened with age; however, they cite to no "younger" authority overruling or even
questioning Logan's solid, time-proven holding and rationale. The maturity of that decision,
along with numerous other Utah water rights decisions, demonstrates the strength of the
precedent.
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right to use water that was not specified in the decree; otherwise, the decree would be a
"futile proceeding." Id at 228, 268 P. at 778. Moreover, the Logan court stated that
it is of no consequence whatever that the claims of Logan City for power
purposes were not referred to in the pleadings or the judgment. The action
itself was a challenge to Logan City to assert any claim it had, of any nature or
kind, which was adverse to or inconsistent with the rights claimed in the
pleadings.
Id at 227-28, 268 P. at 778 (emphasis added).
Like the claim in Logan, the Hickens' claim to divert continuously from Spring
Creek was resolved by the 1960 Judgment. Wall was diverting water any time and in any
amount he wanted. These diversions disrupted North Ditch's water distribution to its
stockholders. As in the first determination in Logan, here Judge Nelson in 1960 determined
from Wall's evidence of water use (i) the maximum quantity of water Wall could divert; and
(ii) how often Wall needed to divert from Spring Creek.
(R. 56-57.) Both conclusions hinged on how Wall had used Spring Creek water. Judge
Nelson ruled that the Hickens' predecessor could divert only one-half of the flow of Spring
Creek for a period of two hours every ten days. (R. 56-57.) This resolution restored order by
establishing the maximum quantity of water that each party could divert and schedule of
diversions from Spring Creek. (R. 56-57.)
The legal effect of the 1960 Decree forever bars the Hickens' claim to a
diversion other than for one-half the flow of Spring Creek for a period of two hours every ten
days. Any other result would render the 1960 Judgment futile and a nullity. As in Logan,
the res judicata bar applies even though neither the pleadings nor the 1960 Judgment
expressly referenced a claim to divert continuously for "watering livestock." Under Logan,
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which applies as much now as in 1960, Wall was required in the 1960 litigation to assert any
right to divert continuously from Spring Creek for watering livestock or any other use. See
Logan, 72 Utah at 227-28, 268 P. at 778. The Hickens' claim is barred because they are
raising an issue that the 1960 Judgment resolved.
B.

The Hickens' Predecessor Could Have and Should Have Claimed a
Right to Divert Continuously for Watering Livestock.

To the extent the Hickens assert that their claim was not already litigated, their
claim is barred by claim preclusion. Wall could and should have claimed a right to divert
continuously for watering stock. The Hickens argue that the 1960 Judgment determined only
Wall's right to divert water from Spring Creek for irrigating his property. (Hickens' Brief at
10.) They suggest that the 1960 Judgment did not determine a claim to divert continuously
from Spring Creek for watering livestock. However, not only would this theory prevent final
resolution of anyone's rights (water users in years to come could raise new uses not expressly
mentioned before), but the Hickens' claim to divert continuously is barred because their
predecessor could and should have raised it in 1960.
The Utah Supreme Court explained in Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528
(Utah 1981), that claim preclusion
is equally applicable to a defense which might have been but was not asserted
in connection with an earlier proceeding (which terminated in a final judgment)
in what is essentially a single and continuing controversy over the appropriate
relief to give for a single wrong or a closely related group of wrongs.
Id at 531.
The Supreme Court has applied this principle to bar an irrigation company's
effort to change a prior water rights decree in Warren Irrigation Co. v. Brown, 28 Utah 2d
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103, 498 P.2d 667 (1972). There, the irrigation company sought to decrease the quantity of
water awarded to the defendants' predecessors in a 1914 decree. The defendants' rights were
defined in a stipulation between the irrigation company and the defendants' predecessors. The
stipulation was incorporated into the 1914 decree. In 1972, the irrigation company filed a
lawsuit claiming defendants were entitled to less water than what was decreed in 1914
because of the legal effect of a 1903 deed. The irrigation company challenged the 1914
decree and a subsequent 1938 decree affirming the 1914 decree. The trial court applied
principles of claim preclusion and
found that the rights and obligations of the parties had been determined by the
[1914 and 1938] decrees, and the matter was now res judicata. The court
observed that after living with these decrees for nearly 50 years, plaintiff was
not in a position to raise issues, which were or could have been previously
settled.
Id. at 106, 498 P.2d at 669 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court agreed and affirmed.
See id. at 107, 498 P.2d at 670.
The Hickens' claim to divert continuously from Spring Creek is no different.
After living with the 1960 Judgment for 35 years, the Hickens cannot raise their claim now; it
could have or should have been litigated in 1960. Wall claimed that he could divert from
Spring Creek any quantity of water, any time he wanted, and thereby disrupted North Ditch's
distribution of water for its shareholders. Obviously Wall's boundless claim would have
included continuous diversions for watering livestock, if he had such a right. To preserve his
rights, Wall was forced to present evidence of his diversions and use of Spring Creek water.
(R. 56-57.) From the evidence and stipulation of the parties, Wall was found to have a right
to divert one-half of the flow of Spring Creek for two hours every ten days.
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The Hickens base their claim for a continuous diversion on the Diligence Claim
filed with the state engineer's office two days prior to the 1960 hearing. The Hickens'
reliance on this Diligence Claim is analogous to the 1903 deed raised in Warren Irrigation.
Like the irrigation company's untimely 1903-deed argument, the Hickens' predecessor knew
of the Diligence Claim before the 1960 hearing and thus, could have and should have raised it
there. The Diligence Claim, also like the 1903-deed, conclusively demonstrates that if Wall
had such a right,7 he could have raised the claim to divert continuously from Spring Creek.
Undoubtedly, if he had such right, Wall should have claimed it for stock watering. Because
Wall raised no such "right," the Hickens are precluded from claiming one at this late date.
C.

The 1960 Judgment is a Final Decision On the Merits.

The 1960 Judgment is res judicata as to the Hickens' claim because it is a final
decision on the merits. The Hickens' attempt to evade res judicata by incorrectly casting the
1960 Judgment as just a "general adjudication" of water rights by the state engineer which
would not bar a subsequent action. (Hickens' Brief at 11-16.) A general adjudication of
water rights is a special proceeding conducted primarily by the state engineer pursuant to Utah
statutes. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-1 to -24 (1989 & Supp. 1996) (addendum to Hickens'
Brief); see also Provo River Water User's Ass'n v. Morgan. 857 P.2d 927, 929 & n.l (Utah
1993).8 The Hickens cite authorities interpreting general adjudication decrees that do not

7

The affidavits attached as support for the Hickens' Diligence Claim never mention
water being used for stock watering. (R. 4-11.)
8

A general adjudication is commenced under the following conditions. The state
engineer initiates a general adjudication after (i) a qualified number of water users file a
petition; and (ii) an investigation demonstrates a water rights determination is justified. See
Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-1. A water user may initiate a general adjudication if (i) the
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apply here. See, e.g., Provo River, 857 P.2d at 928-35 (interpreting general adjudication
decree); Orderville Irrigation Co. v. Glendale Irrigation Co., 17 Utah 2d 282, 409 P.2d 616
(1965) (same).
In Orderville, the Supreme Court observed that for purposes of res judicata "it
is important to keep in mind that we are not here concerned with the usual type of judgment."
17 Utah 2d at 285, 409 P.2d at 619. The Court held that rule of res judicata does not prevent
actions over disputed general adjudication decrees. See id., 409 P.2d at 619. However, this
rule does not apply to judgments that are not general adjudications of water rights. See
Logan, Hyde Park & Smithfield Canal Co. v. Logan City, 72 Utah 221, 268 P. 776 (1928)
(applying res judicata to water rights decree that was not a general adjudication); Warren
Irrigation Co. v. Brown, 28 Utah 2d 103, 498 P.2d 667 (1972) (same).
The 1960 Judgment is a usual type of judgment that is subject to the principles
of res judicata. See, e.g.. Little v. Greene & Weed Inv., 839 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 1992)
(recognizing that "[pjrivate suits . . . may be brought to adjudicate water rights") and cases
cited therein. The 1960 Judgment is not a general adjudication, and therefore, the principles
applied in the Orderville and Provo River decisions do not apply here. North Ditch did not
file its 1960 lawsuit, and the same was not conducted, as a general adjudication under Utah
Code Ann. §§ 73-4-1 to -24. Rather, a single irrigation company, North Ditch, sued an
individual water user, Mr. Wall. Further, the 1960 lawsuit did not involve a major part of

determination involves the "major part of the water" of a "river system, lake, underground
basin, or other natural source of supply" or (ii) the rights of ten or more claimants to water
from such source. Id § 73-4-3. In any lawsuit involving a water rights dispute, district
courts have discretion to order the state engineer to investigate and survey all rights to the
water source involved. See id. § 73-4-1.
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any water source but a small stream, Spring Creek, in Wallsburg, Utah. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 73-4-3. The then pending general adjudication covered Utah County not Spring Creek or
any other water source in Wasatch County. (R. 2.) The pending general adjudication was not
expanded to include Spring Creek until 1972, twelve (12) years after the 1960 Judgment. (R.
2.) The 1960 Judgment was completely unrelated to and separate from the pending general
adjudication.9
D.

The 1960 Judgment Unambiguously Prohibits the Hickens From
Diverting Continuously.

Regardless of the use to which the Hickens put Spring Creek water, the 1960
Judgment unambiguously restricts their diversions to one-half the flow for a period of two
hours every ten days. The Hickens suggest that the 1960 Judgment covered only their
"irrigation rights" and not their right to divert continuously from Spring Creek for stock
watering.

In so characterizing the 1960 Judgment, the Hickens ignore and unfortunately

distort Judge Nelson's 1960 findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Judge Nelson found that North Ditch had appropriated two-thirds of the flow of
Spring Creek. (R. 57.) Judge Nelson found that Wall and his predecessors "since before
1900" used Spring Creek water "in the amounts they thought necessary and at the times they
desired to irrigate lawn, garden and pasture." (R. 57 (emphasis added).) North Ditch was
challenging Wall's right to divert unlimited quantities of water whenever he wanted from
Spring Creek, not just the quantities he used for irrigation. (R. 56-57, 59.) These findings

9

The Hickens incorrectly state that the 1960 Judgment was entered during the pendency
of a general adjudication. (Hickens' Brief, at 17-18) In 1960, no pending general
adjudication included Spring Creek; as such, Mitchell v. Spanish Fork West Field Irr. Co., 1
Utah 2d 313, 265 P.2d 1016 (1954) does not apply here.
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demonstrate that Judge Nelson determined from evidence of Wall's water use the quantity of
water that Wall could divert from Spring Creek for all of his uses.
Further, Judge Nelson found that Wall could "beneficially use" on his property
"one-half of the flow of Spring Creek for a period of two hours every 10 days." (R. 57.)
This finding is critical because beneficial use is the "basis, the measure and the limit of all
rights to the use of water in this state." Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3. Judge Nelson found that
Wall had no right to divert any quantity he wanted but was limited to the quantity of water
that he and predecessors had put to beneficial use on his property. (R. 56-57) Based on
Wall's evidence of his beneficial use, Judge Nelson found that the measure and limit which
Wall could divert was solely one-half the flow of Spring Creek for a period of two hours
every ten days. (R. 56-57.) This measure and limit applies to any use whether for stock
watering or irrigation.
Judge Nelson also found that Wall's diversions of Spring Creek water "in the
amounts he desires and at the time he desires creates a very difficult situation for [North
Ditch] in attempting to regulate the water turns of its stockholders." (R. 57.) This finding
also demonstrates that the 1960 litigation did not exclude Wall's right, if any, to divert
continuously for stock watering. When Wall could divert was a critical issue in the 1960
litigation because Wall was disrupting North Ditch's distribution of Spring Creek water to its
shareholders. To restore and maintain harmony, Judge Nelson ordered Wall to "take his water
in turns compatible with the water turns of the stockholders of North Ditch." (R. 56.) Judge
Nelson also determined that Wall's "first turn" would "commence in the afternoon of July 8,
1960." (R. 56.) Obviously, if Wall had a right to divert continuously for stock watering,
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Judge Nelson would have had to provide for the same in the 1960 Judgment. Because Wall
was not granted a right to divert continuously for stock watering, the Hickens' claim is
barred.
1.

The Term "Turns" Bars Continuous Diversions for Stock Watering

The 1960 Judgment should be interpreted "in accordance with the ordinary and
usual meaning of the words used." Plain City Irr. Co. v. Hooper Irr. Co., 11 Utah 2d 188,
191, 356 P.2d 625, 627 (I960).10 By using the term "turns," Judge Nelson did not limit the
1960 Judgment to irrigation use. "Turns" inherently precludes a continuous diversion from
Spring Creek for any use.

The ordinary or usual meaning of "turn" is an "opportunity"

afforded in "simple succession or in a scheduled order." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary 1273 (1987). Judge Nelson ordered Wall to divert only during his turns to restore
harmony between the parties by imposing a scheduled order of diversions from Spring Creek.
The 1960 Judgment ensured that harmony would be maintained by ordering Wall to divert
only for two hours every ten days, Wall's turn. Continuous diversions would be contrary to
this or any diversion schedule. The plain and usual meaning of "turns" requires the Hickens
and North Ditch shareholders to divert water "in a scheduled order" just as people must take
turns being examined by the same physician.

0

The "plain language rule" simply requires that documents be construed and applied
according to their plain language. See CIG Exploration, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 897
P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1995), cert, denied. 116 S. Ct. 699 (1996); Archer v. Board of State
Lands & Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1995); however, the document must be read in
its entirety, Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982), so as
to harmonize all of its provisions, and all of its provisions must be given effect. See Larrabee
v. Royal Dairy Products Co.. 614 P.2d 160 (Utah 1980); Jones v. Hinkle. 611 P.2d 733 (Utah
1980).
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The Hickens claim "the term 'turns' is generally used only when referring to
irrigation water distribution." (Hickens' Brief at 11.) Not only is this not the plain and usual
meaning, the decisions the Hickens cite do not support this generalization. One of those
decisions confirms that water rights decrees have required users to divert water intermittently
on "turns" for both irrigation and stock watering use. The decision cited by the Hickens,
Lasson v. Seelv, 120 Utah 679, 238 P.2d 418 (1951), and a related case, McKean v. Lasson,
5 Utah 2d 168, 298 P.2d 827 (1956), both address a general adjudication called the Smith
Decree. The Smith Decree established rights to divert water intermittently on turns from a
stream. See McKean, 5 Utah 2d at 170, 298 P.2d at 828; Sedy, 120 Utah at 682, 238 P.2d at
420. However, the parties had to use or store the diverted water during each of their
intermittent turns for both irrigation and stock watering. McKean, 5 Utah 2d at 172, 298 P.2d
at 830. u The Smith Decree did not grant any user a right to divert continuously from the
stream for stock watering, contrary to what the Hickens imply.12
2.

The District Court Correctly Disregarded the Hickens' Assertions of
Continuous Diversions Since 1960

The district court did not err in disregarding the Hickens' assertion that they
have diverted continuously from Spring Creek for watering stock since before 1960. Once the

11

The water users constructed watertight dams to store water for irrigation and stock
watering during the drier season. McKean, 5 Utah 2d at 172, 298 P.2d at 830; see also Seely,
120 Utah at 688, 238 P.2d at 422 (recognizing that water users can store diverted water in
reservoir for further use).
12

The decision in Bigler v. Mapleton Irrigation Canal Co., 669 P.2d 434 (Utah 1983)
does not state whether the shareholders of the irrigation company had rights for stock
watering. However, if they did, they did not have rights to continuously divert because they
were limited to divert intermittently on a turn every ten days to three weeks.
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1960 Judgment was entered, the Hickens and their predecessors were prohibited from
diverting continuously from Spring Creek. Any continuous diversion after July 8, 1960 would
have been and remains a violation of the 1960 Judgment. (R. 56.) Assuming the Hickens
and their predecessor have diverted continuously since July 8, 1960, they would have been
doing so unlawfully and causing exactly what led to the 1960 litigation, i.e., the disruption of
North Ditch's distribution of water to its shareholders.
However, by their own admission, the Hickens have not diverted continuously
from Spring Creek for stock watering since the 1960 Judgment. Under their Water User's
Claim, they claim only a "2/240" interest in the flow of Spring Creek for both irrigation and
stock watering. Moreover, they specifically acknowledge that they have a decreed right based
on the 1960 Judgment. (R. 5.) The 2/240 interest is simply another way of saying two hours
every 240 hours (or ten days) when read in conjunction with the 1960 Judgment. The
Hickens, therefore, admit that they did not have a right to divert continuously for stock
watering.13
Finally, the 1960 Judgment unequivocally prohibits continuous diversions from
Spring Creek to ensure an orderly distribution of water for the benefit of all users.14 The

13

If the Hickens have diverted Spring Creek continuously contrary to their Water User's
Claim and the 1960 Judgment, they would have unclean hands by having made a sworn false
statement in their Water User's Claim.
14

The Record demonstrates that North Ditch did not acquiesce or otherwise agree to
allow the Hickens to divert continuously from Spring Creek in contravention of the 1960
Judgment. The exact opposite is alleged. North Ditch ignored the Hickens' claim to divert
continuously. (R. 31.) North Ditch has "repeatedly removed" the Hickens' "diversion
structure." (R. 30.) North Ditch denied the Hickens' claim to continuously divert. (R. 30.)
North Ditch would not respect the Hickens' right to continuously divert from Spring Creek.
(R. 26.) Finally, North Ditch "interfered with" the Hickens' continuous diversions from
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Hickens' assertions conclusively demonstrate why their claim should be precluded under the
doctrine of res judicata.
3.

The Hickens5 Livestock are not Threatened if the Hickens are
Precluded From Diverting Continuously

The Hickens imply that their cattle will die without a continuous diversion
from Spring Creek for stock watering. (Hickens' Brief at 11.) This alarming suggestion is
exaggerated and misleading. The District Court correctly observed that the Hickens' use of
the intermittently diverted water "could be for any purpose, including watering stock (or
storing it for that purpose). Daily use was not allowed under Judge Nelson's Decree, said use
thereby being precluded." (R. 123; see also Lasson v. Seely, 120 Utah 679, 688, 238 P.2d
418, 422 (1951) (recognizing that water users can store water in reservoir for further use).)
Moreover, the Hickens admit they have a source other than Spring Creek from which they
continuously divert for watering livestock. (R. 81; see also R. 11-12 (describing the Hickens'
water rights in ditch known as Bull River, Mill Race and Back Ditch.) Accordingly, even if
the health of the livestock could alter the 1960 Judgment (and it cannot), the 1960 Judgment
is not inequitable or harsh.
E.
Barring the Hickens' Claim for a Continuous Diversion will
Preserve Vital Public Interests.
The doctrine of res judicata preserves "vital public interests" including "(1)
fostering reliance on prior adjudications; (2) preventing inconsistent decisions; (3) relieving
parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits; and (4) preserving judicial resources."

Spring Creek. (R. 19.)
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Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and cases
cited therein.
For over 36 years North Ditch has relied on the 1960 Judgment which it
correctly believed forever established the diversion schedule for Spring Creek water. The
state engineer also relied on the 1960 Judgment and specifically incorporated the diversion
schedule into the Proposed Determination. (R. 1.) The Proposed Determination restricted the
Hickens to an intermittent diversion of two hours every 240 hours (i.e., ten days) for both
irrigation and stock watering. (R. 1.) The Hickens also manifested their reliance on the 1960
Judgment by specifically referencing the same and claiming only a right to divert
intermittently for both irrigation and stock watering two hours every 240 hours (or ten days).
(R. 5.) To permit the Hickens' claim would undermine all reliance on any judgment that
restricts water users to a maximum quantity of water and an intermittent diversion schedule.
Any party to such a judgment could contrive other water uses not "expressly" referenced in
prior judgments in an endless flow of litigation that would preclude any assurance that water
users will receive their decreed allotment.
Barring the Hickens' claim advances the other policies underlying principles of
res judicata. Inconsistent decisions will be prevented. North Ditch and the Hickens will be
relieved of the significant cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits involving the same stream,
the same parties and the same claims. Moreover, judicial resources will be preserved by not
rehashing the Hickens' claim and those of their successors, all of which were or could have
been resolved in 1960.
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II.

THE HICKENS' CLAIM IS BARRED FOR THEIR FAILURE TO
OBJECT TO THE PROPOSED DETERMINATION
The Hickens' claim to a continuous diversion for watering livestock also is

barred because they failed to object to the Proposed Determination submitted to the Third
District Court by the state engineer in 1984. After receiving notice of a proposed
determination, a water claimant has 90 days from the date of mailing of such notice to file a
written objection. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-12. Failure to object timely bars any
subsequent claim. See Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 291-92 (Utah 1992); In re Escalante
Valley Drainage Area. 12 Utah 2d 112, 113, 363 P.2d 777, 778 (1961); Green River
Adjudication v. United States. 17 Utah 2d 50, 52, 404 P.2d 251, 252 (1965) (to avoid
piecemeal litigation and provide "finality and solidarity," untimely objections are barred).
Water users who do not object to a proposed determination must "be bound by the result for
the same sound reasons that justify the doctrine of res judicata." Id at 52, 404 P.2d at 252.
The Proposed Determination restricts the Hickens to divert intermittently water
from Spring Creek for stock watering. The Proposed Determination is based on the Hickens'
Water User's Claim (R. 4-5.) and the 1960 Judgment. The Proposed Determination
specifically references and incorporates the 1960 Judgment by limiting the Hickens' stock
watering to the diversion schedule ordered by Judge Nelson. The Proposed Determination
provides that the Hickens' Water User's Claim is a "court decreed right under civil case 2348"
(i.e., Judge Nelson's 1960 Judgment). (R. 1, 57; see also Hickens' Water User's Claim
(R. 5.).
As claimed by the Hickens in their Water User's Claim, the Proposed
Determination restricts their claim to a "2/240 interest" in a water flow of 3.0 cubic feet per
23
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second. (R. 1.) The Proposed Determination also clarifies that the flow of Spring Creek "is
intermittently diverted" pursuant to the Hickens' Water User's Claim and North Ditch's water
user's claim number 55-4456 ("WUC 55-4456"). (R. 1. (emphasis added).) Moreover, the
Proposed Determination awards North Ditch, in part, a corresponding "238/240 interest" in the
3.0 cubic feet per second flow from Spring Creek "intermittently diverted" by the Hickens.
(R. 1, WUC 55-4456 (emphasis added).) The plain meaning of the term "intermittently" is
not continuously.15 The Proposed Determination specifically limits the Hickens to
"intermittently" divert from Spring Creek for a period of two hours every 240 hours (i.e., ten
days) for both irrigation and stock watering.16 Hence, the Hickens' year-round stock
watering right is expressly restricted to an intermittent not continuous diversion from Spring
Creek.
Had they wished to object to the plain limitations of the Proposed
Determination, the Hickens should have filed a written objection. The Proposed
Determination squarely contradicts the Hickens' claim to a continuous diversion for stock
watering. The Hickens, however, could not object because the Proposed Determination
reflects their Water User's Claim to an intermittent diversion for stock watering based on the
1960 Judgment. Because the Hickens failed to object, their claim is barred.

15

See, e.g., Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 632 (1987) (intermittent means
"coming and going at intervals: not continuous" (emphasis added)).
16

The Proposed Determination provides that the Hickens' Water User's Claim "is limited
to 2/240 interest in [3.0 cfs] which is intermittently diverted by" the Hickens' Water User's
Claim and North Ditch's water user's claim no. 55-4456. (R. 1.) When read in conjunction
with the 1960 Judgment, "2/240" clearly means two hours every 240 hours (240 hours in ten
days). This interpretation is supported by Ruby Wall Hickens' admission as set forth in the
Hicken's Water User's Claim. (R. 4-5.)
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Ironically, the Hickens argue that North Ditch is bound by the Proposed
Determination because it awards the Hickens a year-round stock watering right, and North
Ditch failed to file a written objection. (Hickens' Brief at 16-18.) However, North Ditch
does not dispute that the Hickens may have a right to use Spring Creek for watering stock
year-round, as long as the diversion is intermittent as scheduled (not continuous). North
Ditch did not need to file an objection because the Proposed Determination incorporates the
1960 Judgment by limiting the Hickens to an intermittent diversion from Spring Creek for all
water uses two hours every 240 hours (ten days). In sum, the district court did not err in
disregarding the Proposed Determination in dismissing the Hickens' complaint under the
doctrine of res judicata.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court for
Wasatch County dismissing the verified complaint should be affirmed.
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